

SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS (ODD)

CHAPTER 1

1-1. *Reporting Timelines.* First, consider the technology that was available in Hawaii on 7 December 1941. What “products” should have been forthcoming from the Intelligence Community to Fleet Headquarters at Pearl Harbor? On what timeline should they have been delivered, and by what distribution method? Then, consider the technology that is available today and decide if such a surprise attack could still be pulled off.

SUGGESTED SOLUTION: In the months and weeks prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor, open sources revealed Japanese expansion across the Pacific and aggression in China. The United States was in political-economic negotiations with Japan over supplying oil to them, which was curtailed in July 1941. In anticipation of hostilities, the US deployed forces to Hawaii and the Philippines. Intelligence (information) products were prepared detailing the Japanese need for resources to power their war machine, and speculated on their further push into Southeast Asia. What was not known (or at least appreciated) was the Japanese assessment of how much US forces might interfere with their expansion. They planned a surprise attack to preempt their opposition. SIGINT/COMINT may have been able to pick up communications of such plans.

In the days of 1941 before spaceflight, radar was in its infancy (developed along the coast of England), but was deployed on Oahu. It was adequate for detecting incoming aircraft and providing 20-minute warning, yet direction finding and positive identification of aircraft was primitive. (Incoming aircraft *were* detected, but were thought to be US planes from the West Coast.) Assuming both sides could monitor each other’s radio frequencies, verbal reports (products!) from the coastal radar sites to Pearl Harbor headquarters should have been via landline. If such calls were made, they were not evaluated properly for their threat value. The rest is history.

Intelligence products can provide evidence of such movements within months-to-days of their deployment to action. Of course, what cannot be discerned from mere observations is an enemy’s *intent* – a very much more difficult problem. Nonetheless, it is extremely unlikely a large-scale attack could be pulled off today. More insidious is the work of individual terrorists and small cells of radicals. Detecting and understanding them is the present challenge.